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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS A GOOD FAITH, REASONABLE
BELIEF EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
OSHA PROCEEDINGS
Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.
1982)
In Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.,I the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit extended the "good faith ex-
ception" to the exclusionary rule2 to federal administrative agency pro-
ceedings by refusing to suppress evidence obtained from a reasonable
and good faith Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) inspection conducted under authority of a search warrant sub-
sequently declared invalid.3
Following an accident to an employee of Federal Clearing Die Cast-
ing Company (Federal) on Federars premises,4 OSHA compliance of-
ficers sought to conduct a safety inspection of the company's
workplace.5 Although the officers possessed a search warrant,6 Federal
1. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. One common definition of the good faith exception reads as follows: "[W]hen an officer
acts in the good faith belief that his conduct is constitutional and where he has a reasonable basis
for that belief, the exclusionary rule will not operate." Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amend-
men: The "'Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635,
635 (1978).
As enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), two basic types of good faith exception exist. Id. at 841
(quoting Ball, supra, at 635-36). A "good faith mistake" occurs when a police officer errs in deter-
mining whether sufficient facts exist to constitute probable cause. Id. A "technical violation"
occurs when a police officer acts pursuant to a warrant that is later invalidated, a statute that is
later declared unconstitutional, or a judicial precedent that is later overruled. Id See also Ball,
supra at 639-44; Cochell, The Exclusionary Rule and its Applicability to OSH.4 Civil Enforcement
Proceedings, 12 U. BALT. L. Rv. 1, 14 (1982); infra note 31 and accompanying text.
The good faith exception has been the subject of considerable commentary. See, e.g., Ball,
supra; Mertens & Wasserstrom, he Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365 (1981); Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary
Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875 (1982);
Note, Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1610
(1982).
3. 695 F.2d at 1022-25. The Eleventh Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion in Donovan
v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (1lth Cir. 1982), issued one week after the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Federal Die. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
4. 695 F.2d at 1021.
5. Id. Federal statute authorizes OSHA officials to enter private commercial premises for
the purpose of conducting inspections to ascertain the existence of safety and health violations. 29
U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982). If an employer refuses to admit OSHA inspectors, the inspectors may
procure a search warrant and return to the worksite to conduct the investigation. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1903.4 (1983).
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refused entry, claiming that the magistrate improperly issued the war-
rant.7 After a federal district court found the warrant valid,8 OSHA
compliance officers inspected Federal's premises and issued a number
of safety citations.' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit invalidated the
search warrant,' 0 and Federal subsequently moved in administrative
proceedings to suppress all evidence obtained through the use of the
invalid warrant." An administrative law judge of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)' 2 granted Federal's
motion 13 and dismissed the proceedings.14 On appeal, the Seventh Cir-
6. 695 F.2d at 1021. A United States magistrate issued a warrant for the inspection of Fed-
eral's workplace upon the application of an OSHA compliance officer. Id. The officer supported
his warrant application with two newspaper articles describing an industrial accident in which a
Federal employee allegedly severed his hands while operating a hydraulic press punch and an
OSHA citation and notification of proposed penalty issued to Federal following an inspection of
its workplace more than four years earlier. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655
F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1981).
7. 655 F.2d at 795.
8. After Federal refused to permit OSHA officers onto its premises, OSHA petitioned the
district court for an adjudication of civil contempt, and Federal filed a motion to quash the war-
rant in the same court. Id. The district court issued an order of civil contempt against Federal
and ordered Federal to cooperate in the inspection of its premises. Id.
9. 695 F.2d at 1021. The compliance officers issued four safety citations, alleging sixteen
serious, five willful, five repeated, and two minor violations and proposed penalties of $35,400.
Id. at 1021 n.2.
10. 655 F.2d at 795-98. The court of appeals found that probable cause did not exist for the
issuance of the OSHA inspection warrant because the OSHA officials failed to present to the
issuing magistrate "specific evidence" of an existing violation. Id. at 795-96. Specifically, the
court held that two newspaper articles discussing the accident and an apparently unrelated 1975
OSHA citation did not constitute probable cause. Id. at 796.
In the context of administrative search law, courts will issue a warrant under a much more
relaxed probable cause standard than that which the criminal law requires. Note, Admissibility of
Illegally Seized Evidence in Subsequent Civil Proceedings: Focusing on Motve to Determine Deter-
rence, 51 FoRDu-iAm L. REV. 1019, 1032 n.72 (1983). A magistrate may issue an administrative
warrant upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
inspection" have been satisfied. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 524, 538 (1967)).
11. 695 F.2d at 1021.
12. OSHRC adjudicates the validity of all OSHA citations, penalties, and abatement orders.
29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982). See generally Cochell, supra note 2, at 3 n.12.
13. 695 F.2d at 1021. The administrative law judge relied on OSHRC's ruling in Secretary of
Labor v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (Rev. Comm'n 1981), which held on
similar facts that evidence obtained from inspections that failed to meet minimum standards of
probable cause should be excluded from consideration in OSHA proceedings. Id. at 1612-15.
The Secretary of Labor appealed OSHRC's decision, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Dono-
van v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (1 1th Cir. 1982), affirming the administrative law
judge's decision, was rendered one week after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Federal Die. See
infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text for an analysis of Sarasoia.
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cuit reversed and held: (1) evidence gathered through OSHA's reason-
able and good faith inspection pursuant to a warrant upheld by the
district court should not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule be-
cause a reviewing court subsequently invalidated the warrant; and (2) a
good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule is ap-
propriate in OSHA proceedings.1 5
The exclusionary rule' 6 generally prohibits the use of evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment 7 in criminal proceedings.' 8 To
14. 695 F.2d at 1021.
15. Id. at 1021-25.
16. The Supreme Court first employed the exclusionary rule in the seminal case of Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in which the Court held that evidence seized in violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights was inadmissible in federal criminal trials. Id. at 398. The
Court extended the rule to state criminal prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For
a concise history of the rule's development, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976);
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment. The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 621, 625-40.
Courts historically have advanced three theories justifying the exclusionary rule: (1) the en-
forcement of a personal constitutional right, (2) the maintenance of judicial integrity, and (3) the
deterrence of official misconduct. See generally Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule: Should
the Emplover Go Free Because the Compliance Officer has BlunderedZ 1981 DuKE L.J. 667, 676-87.
Presently, courts invoke the exclusionary rule primarily, if not exclusively, to deter government
officials from committing fourth amendment violations. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) ("purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct"); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("the primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the
deterrence of police conduct that violates fourth amendment rights"); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 446 (1976) ("prime purpose of the rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful
police conduct"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) ("purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guarantee").
Under the personal right theory, the exclusionary rule vindicates personal constitutional rights.
Note, supra note 10, at 1019 n.2. Failure to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Consti-
tution, according to this theory, is a "denial of the constitutional rights of the accused." Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-06 (1921).
The essence of the judicial integrity theory is two-fold: the suppression of illegally seized evi-
dence protects the integrity of the courts and safeguards popular trust in governmental institu-
tions. Trant, supra at 680; see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
17. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The language of the fourth amendment is vague. The amendment neither defines "unreasona-
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date, however, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil and administra-
tive proceedings. 19 In the absence of a definitive pronouncement by the
Court, lower federal and state courts have reached confficting results.20
Prior to 1967, courts generally did not extend the fourth amend-
ment's proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures to ad-
ministrative inspections.2' In the companion cases of Camara v.
ble" nor provides sanctions for its violation. Trant, supra note 16, at 667. The courts developed
the exclusionary rule, at least in criminal cases, to resolve these ambiguities. Id. at 667-68.
18. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Supreme Court has fashioned
several exceptions to the rule, narrowing its scope. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628
(1980) (evidence seized in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights may be used for
impeachment if he takes the stand at trial); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (un-
lawfully obtained evidence may be used in federal civil tax cases); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (unlawfully obtained evidence may be used in grand jury hearings); Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (evidence unlawfully obtained by private individuals is
admissible in criminal cases).
19. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976) (the Supreme Court has never ap-
plied the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence from a federal or state civil proceeding); Savina
Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1979) (general applicability of
the exclusionary rule to noncriminal contexts has not been decided by the Supreme Court).
20. Courts have held the exclusionary rule applicable to the following noncriminal proceed-
ings. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978) (probation revocation);
Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 466 (9th Cir. 1976) (private suit against
I.C.C.); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d Cir.) (IRS jeopardy assessment), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); Knoll Assocs. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-37 (7th Cir. 1968) (FTC
order); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Air Force discharge); Rogers v.
United States, 97 F.2d 691, 691-92 (1st Cir. 1938) (action to recover duties on imported liquors);
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (civil rights action); Lassoff v.
Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 846-49 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (civil tax assessment); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa
County Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz. App. 419, 422, 520 P.2d 332, 335 (1974) (employment
disciplinary proceeding). Courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule in the following non-
criminal proceedings. See United States ex rel Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1970) (parole revocation); Emslie v. State Bar, I1 Cal. 3d 210, 229, 520 P.2d 991, 1002, 113
Cal. Rptr. 175, 186 (1974) (attorney disciplinary proceeding); In re Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641, 649-
51, 463 P.2d 734, 740-41, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388-89, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970) (parole
revocation); Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 551,
111 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727-28 (1974) (employment disciplinary proceeding).
21. Note, The Applicability ofthe Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceed.
ings, 66 IowA L. REv. 343, 356 (1981).
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), for example, the Supreme Court refused to set aside
the defendant's criminal conviction for not permitting a warrantless inspection of his home by a
Baltimore health inspector. In concluding that the search did not violate the fourth amendment,
the Court noted that the defendant's privacy interests were on the "periphery" of the fourth
amendment protection against official intrusion. Id. at 367. The decision in Frank, however, was
overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 397 U.S. 523 (1967).
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Municipal Court22 and See v. City of Seattle,23 the Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment's search warrant requirement applies to ad-
ministrative searches of private and commercial dwellings.24 Neverthe-
less, courts continued to assume that the fourth amendment did not
apply to OSHA inspections. 25  Consequently, they never fully ad-
dressed the issue of applying exclusionary sanctions to OSHA
inspections.26
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court definitively established that
fourth amendment protections apply to OSHA compliance inspections
in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.27 The Court held that the fourth amend-
ment prohibits nonconsensual warrantless inspections of businesses by
OSHA compliance officers. 28  The Court did not, however, determine
the extent to which courts must apply exclusionary sanctions in OSHA
proceedings.29 Subsequent judicial and OSHRC decisions similarly
failed to delineate the exclusionary rule's applicability to OSHA
proceedings. 30
22. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
23. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
24. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); see Cochell, supra note 2, at 5. In Camara, the Supreme Court held that administrative
searches of private dwellings must be conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant based on a
relaxed showing of probable cause in the absence of voluntary consent. 387 U.S. at 539-40. The
Court in See extended the Camara premise-to commercial dwellings, holding that "[t]he business-
man, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property." 387 U.S. at 543.
25. See, e.g., Hoffman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 546 F.2d 281, 282-83 (9th Cir. 1976) (evidence
discovered in the course of an illegal inspection not suppressed in the absence of fourth amend-
ment prejudice); Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1975) (minor non-
prejudicial violations by OSHA compliance officers do not violate the fourth amendment), cert.
denied. 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
26. Trant, supra note 16, at 687.
27. 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978). In Barlow's, an OSHA inspector requested permission to
conduct a routine inspection of the work area in Barlow's electrical and plumbing plant to ensure
compliance with safety and health regulations. Id. at 309-10. When informed that the inspector
did not possess a search warrant, Barlow refused to admit him and subsequently sought and ob-
tained injunctive relief against the warrantless search. Id. at 310.
28. Id. at 312-13.
29. Because no "search" had yet taken place, and because the suit sought to prevent a war-
rantless search from ever occurring, no "fruits" of a warrantless search could be objected to at the
OSHRC hearing.
30. Post-Barlow's decisions in which the applicability of exclusionary sanctions to illegal
OSHA searches was at issue uniformly held that because the effect of Barlow's was prospective
only, the question of the exclusionary rule did not require immediate resolution. See Robberson
Steel Co. v. OSHRC, 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980); Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594
F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 587 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.
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Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule,3" a number of Justices have expressed dissatis-
faction with the rule's undesirable effects 32 and have urged adoption of
1978); Daniel Int'l Corp., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1142 (Rev. Comm'n 1980); Meadows Indus., Inc.,
7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1709 (Rev. Comm'n 1979).
While these courts reached similar results, their analyses of related issues often varied consider-
ably. Compare Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1978)
("[because] the Supreme Court has never applied the exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding...
the rule should not be applied to OSHA proceedings.") (citing United States v. Janis, 425 U.S.
433, 447 (1976)) with Savina Home Indus. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir.
1979) ("the exclusionary rule would be applicable to OSHA proceedings involving inspections
violative of the warrant requirements announced in Barlow'r.").
31. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 692 (1982) (Court has not "to date" recognized a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). The Supreme Court recently declined to adopt a
good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule in Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct.
641 (1984), and Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). This term, the Court has heard arguments
in two criminal cases which raise the good faith issue. See United States v. Leon, 701 F,2d 187
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (U.S. June 27, 1983) (No. 82-1771), argued, 52
U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. January 17, 1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d
725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (U.S. June 27, 1983), argued, 52 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S.
January 17, 1984).
In certain instances, the Supreme Court has recognized a "technical good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-40 (1979)
(evidence seized in good faith reliance on an ordinance later declared unconstitutional should not
be suppressed); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1975) (fourth amendment violation
does not require application of the exclusionary rule where officers rely on a statute subsequently
declared unconstitutional); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436-47 (1974) (exclusionary rule not
applied where police questioned a criminal suspect in violation of fifth amendment rights subse-
quently announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
Express support for a "good faith mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule in criminal cases
has appeared in three Court opinions. In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), Justice Powell
argued that the courts should not suppress reliable evidence which is not the product of willful or
negligent police misconduct. Id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring). Similarly, in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), Justice White argued in dissent that police officers cannot be expected to
conform to fourth amendment requirements when they are not aware that their actions are unlaw-
ful. Id. at 537-40 (White, J., dissenting). Finally, in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983),
Justice White reiterated his concerns first expressed in Stone and argued that the exclusionary rule
is inappropriate where government officials act in the reasonable belief that a search and seizure is
consistent with the fourth amendment. Id. at 2336 (White, J., concurring). See generally Note, Is
it Timefor a Change in the Exclusionary Rule? United States v. Williams and the Good Faith
Exception, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 169-71 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White, the Court's most outspoken critic of the exclusionary rule, observed that the primary cost
of the rule is its interference with the "truthseeking function of a criminal trial by barring relevant
and trustworthy evidence." Id. at 2342 (White, J., concurring). He noted that the rule discourages
police from reasonable and proper investigative actions and places an extreme burden on state
and federal judicial systems. Id. (White, J., concurring). In addition, Justice White found that
indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule generates disrespect for the law and under-
mines public confidence in the criminal justice system. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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such an exception.33 In the absence of definitive Supreme Court action,
however, courts and legislatures have joined in a growing movement
toward acceptance of some form of good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule in criminal cases.34 In United States v. Williams,35 the
Fifth Circuit held that it would not apply the exclusionary rule in crim-
inal proceedings where officers mistakenly, though reasonably and in
good faith, believed that they acted lawfuly.36 Several other federal
and state courts have similarly adopted good faith exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.37 In addition, several bills have been introduced in
33. Four current members of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehn-
quist, Powell, and White, have openly supported adoption of a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule in criminal cases. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); id. at 538-39 (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 606, 616 (1975) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring); Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 531-42 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.); supra note
31;see also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cer. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981); Ball, supra note 2, at 635, 652-53; Note, supra note 2, at 1617. In addition,
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun seem in favor of reducing the scope of the exclusionary rule. Id.
34. See Note, supra note 2, at 1617; see also infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
35. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). In Williams,
the Fifth Circuit refused to suppress two packets of heroin seized illegally by drug enforcement
officials who thought that they had conducted a lawful search and arrest. Id. at 833-36.
36. Id. at 840.
37. In United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 396-400 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania refused to suppress evidence gathered in an illegal house search where the
police officer acted in a manner consistent with the law, the intrusion on the defendant's right was
minimal, and no deterrent effect existed for future police conduct. In United States v. Wyler, 502
F Supp. 959, 973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the Southern District of New York refused to suppress
documents found in a good faith, but unlawful, house search that led to the identity of a victim in
a previously undiscovered crime, holding that neither the purposes of the exclusionary rule nor
the public interest would benefit from exclusion of the evidence. In State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389,
402, 636 P.2d 637, 650 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court
applied a Williams-type test when a police officer illegally seized photographs of a murder scene in
good faith reliance on state law as he understood it on the advice of a legal expert. In People v.
Eichelberger, 620 P.2d 1067, 1071 n.2 (Colo. 1980) (en bane), the Colorado Supreme Court cited
Williams and noted that the exclusionary rule penalizes willful or flagrant police actions, not
reasonable actions. In People v. Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1110, 411 N.E.2d 295, 307 (1980), the
police obtained a confession in a search pursuant to a quashed warrant. The Illinois Appellate
Court refused to exclude the confession because it found that the police officers satisfied the Wil-
liams test of "reasonable and good faith belief.., in the propriety of their conduct." Id. In
Richmond v. Commonwealth, 50 U.S.L.W. 2162, 2162-63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), af'd, 637 S.W.2d
642 (Ky. 1982), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that evidence seized in good faith reliance on
an invalid warrant should not be suppressed when suppression would have no deterrence effect.
Finally, m People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9-11, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541-42, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881-82
(1981) the New York Court of Appeals found that when officers rely in good faith on the apparent
capability of an individual to consent to a warrantless search, and the circumstances reasonably
indicate that the individual possesses the authority to consent, evidence obtained as the result of
such a search should not be suppressed because the individual lacked authority to consent.
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Congress to modify or eliminate the exclusionary rule."8 At least one
state has specifically enacted legislation creating a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.3 9
No parallel movement toward adoption of a good faith, reasonable
belief exception to the exclusionary rule in civil and administrative pro-
ceedings had begun until Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting
Co.40 One week after the decision in Federal Die, the Eleventh Circuit
explicitly refused to adopt such an exception to the exclusionary rule in
OSHA proceedings in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co.4 In Sarasota,
an administrative law judge invalidated a search warrant that had
served as the basis for a good faith OSHA business inspection42 and
suppressed evidence seized by OSHA officials under the invalid war-
38. E.g., S. 1764, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 11,713 (1983); H.R. 2239, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 1560 (1983). The Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1983 provides:
Section 3505. Limitation of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence which is obtained as a result of a
search or seizure and which is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded in a proceeding
in a court of the United States if the search or seizure was undertaken in a reasonable,
good faith belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within
the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reasonable, good faith
belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and material
misrepresentation.
Id.
The Department of Justice has similarly advocated modification of the exclusionary rule. See
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL
REPORT 55 (1981). Recommendation 40 provides that "evidence should not be excluded from a
criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief
that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. See also Hearings on
the Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comn on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1981) (statement of William French
Smith, Attorney General of the United States) (evidence obtained by officers in the good faith
belief that they were acting in accordance with the fourth amendment should not be excluded
from a criminal proceeding).
39. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308(1) (1981). The statute provides that
[e]vidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed
by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer
... as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation.
40. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); see infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
41. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 1063-64. A former employee of Sarasota alleged that the company improperly
maintained its cement trucks. Id. Six months after the original complaint was issued, a United
States magistrate granted a warrant authorizing an inspection of Sarasota's entire workplace. Id.
OSHA compliance officers sought, received and executed the search warrant in good faith. Id. As
a result of the investigation and inspection, OSHA cited Sarasota for twelve "non-serious" viola-
tions of OSHA regulations. Id. at 1064. None of the violations cited, however, related to Sara-
sota's cement trucks. Id.
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rant.43 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished United States v.
Williams, a criminal case,44 and held that the exclusionary rule is gen-
erally available in OSHA proceedings.
In Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., the Seventh Circuit
accepted a good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary
rule in civil proceedings. 46  The court devoted its entire analysis to a
consideration of the good faith exception in OSHA proceedings. 47 The
majority of the court looked to United States v. Williams48 as its pri-
mary source of authority. 49 Recognizing that the Williams court relied
on the exclusionary rule's underlying purpose of deterring unlawful po-
lice conduct,5" the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the rule does not serve
43. Id. The administrative law judge held that the employee's complaint concerning the
company's cement trucks did not constitute sufficient probable cause to support an investigation of
the company's entire workplace. Id.
44. Id. at 1070-73. The Eleventh Circuit refused to extend the good faith exception enunci-
ated by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), to OSHA proceedings. The court of appeals argued that Williams
was factually dissimilar and concluded that OSHRC was not bound to adhere to the Williams
analysis. Id. at 1072. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Williams court prefaced its
discussion of the good faith exception with a clear statement that its holding would not apply to
situations involving a search warrant. Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840 n. 1).
45. 693 F.2d at 1070-71.
46. 695 F.2d 1020, 1022-25 (7th Cir. 1982).
47. The Seventh Circuit reached, but did not resolve, the issue of the exclusionary rule's
applicability to OSHA inspections conducted pursuant to search warrants subsequently declared
invalid. Cf. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11 th Cir. 1982); supra notes 40-45.
In its haste to discuss the good faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule, the court
of appeals failed to devote any of its analysis to the problem of the rule's general availability in
OSHA proceedings. This oversight is especially surprising because the court realized that the
issue before it was "one of first impression." 695 F.2d at 1021. This omission is also curious given
that logic dictates that a court must first establish a general rule before testing a specific exception
to it.
The court's failure to consider the rule's applicability renders its holding ambiguous because it
is not apparent whether the court tacitly recognized the rule's general availability in this area or
merely refused to apply the rule within the circumstances of the instant case. Arguments can be
made to support both positions. The court prefaced its discussion of the good faith exception by
suggesting that the exclusionary rule should not be applied. Id. at 1023 (citing Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1978)). In contrast, the court twice stated
that its holding was limited to the "circumstances of this case," 695 F.2d at 1023 & n.6, suggesting
that the court did not intend to establish a general rule.
48. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); see supra notes
35-36 and accompanying text.
49. 695 F.2d at 1023-24.
50. The deterrence theory is based upon the common sense notion that the suppression of
illegally seized evidence deters official misconduct. Note, supra note 10, at 1020 n.3; see supra note
16. The court in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
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its basic deterrent purpose when applied to evidence that was gathered
mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds.5 I A good
faith, reasonable belief exception to the exclusionary rule in civil pro-
ceedings, the court argued, would not detract from the rule's deterrence
function. 2 Moreover, the court noted that employers have access to
remedial deterrents other than the exclusionary rule when they believe
OSHA has violated their constitutional rights.5 3
In further support of its position, the Federal Die court relied upon
two Tenth Circuit cases, Robberson Steel Co. v. OSHRC 54 and Savina
Home Industries v. Secretary of Labor.5 Noting that in both cases the
Tenth Circuit refused to apply the exclusionary rule to warrantless
searches where the rule's deterrent purpose could not be served, 6 the
Federal Die majority concluded that the Tenth Circuit recognized a
reasonable, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5 7
The court argued additionally that suppression of the evidence un-
covered by the OSHA inspection would result in "substantial societal
harm."58 In particular, the court contended that application of the ex-
clusionary rule to the facts of the case would preclude OSHRC from
issuing an order requiring prompt abatement of hazardous working
conditions at Federal and would preclude the issuance of subsequent
citations with enhanced penalties to ensure Federal's compliance with
OSHA provisions.5 9  The court concluded that because the OSHA
compliance officers acted both reasonably and in good faith in inspect-
449 U.S. 1127 (1981), like most modem courts, followed the deterrence theory, holding that the
exclusionary rule deters willful or flagrant police misconduct, not reasonable, good faith actions.
Id. at 840.
51. 695 F.2d at 1023.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1024. The court specifically mentioned two such deterrents. First, an OSHA offi-
cial must obtain the approval of a neutral magistrate before conducting an inspection over an
employer's objection. Id. Second, an employer may still move to quash a warrant prior to its
execution or refuse entry pursuant to a warrant unless the OSHA official prevails in civil contempt
proceedings. Id.
54. 645 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
56. Though both cases dealt with the applicability of the exclusionary rule to OSHA proceed-
ings involving warrantless inspections occurring prior to Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978), the court in Robberson noted that the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), is "equally
applicable to civil OSHA enforcement proceedings." 645 F.2d at 22.
57. 695 F.2d at 1024.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court also expressed concern that an OSHA official would not be able to rein-
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ing Federal's workplace, evidence gathered pursuant to that inspection
should not be suppressed.6 °
Judge Pell in dissent criticized the majority's reliance on Williams.6'
He noted that the Williams good faith exception requires both objective
reasonableness and subjective good faith62 and concluded that the
OSHA officials did not act reasonably or in good faith in their inspec-
tion of Federal's premises.63 Judge Pell argued that the majority's reli-
ance on Robberson and Savina was similarly unfounded. Both cases
involved only the retroactive application of the Barlow's warrant re-
quirement;64 the Tenth Circuit therefore did not decide the issue of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in either case.65
Judge Pell cited legislative sources66 and OSHRC decisions67 in sup-
spect an employer's business because of the lack of probable cause to obtain a second search
warrant. 1d.
60. Id. at 1025. The majority noted that the inspection of Federal's premises did not com-
mence until after the district court issued an order of civil contempt against Federal and ordered
Federal to cooperate in the inspection of its premises. Id. The majority concluded that the district
court's approval of the OSHA officials' actions demonstrated that they acted reasonably, cau-
tiously, and in good faith in executing the search warrant. Id See supra note 8.
61. Id. at 1030 (Pell, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Pell, J., dissenting). [Iln addition to being held in subjective good faith, [the officer's
belief] must be grounded in objective reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulable
premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe that he was
acting lawfully." Id. (Pell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841
n.4a (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981)).
63. 695 F.2d at 1026-27, 1029-31 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell explained that OSHA regu-
lations require an OSHA inspector to make a "thorough evaluation of all complaints" of OSHA
violations prior to deciding whether or not to inspect. Id. at 1031 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell
stated that an OSHA official could not reasonably believe that an OSHA violation existed on the
basis of two newspaper articles describing a work accident and an old citation of dubious reliabil-
ity. Id. (Pell, J., dissenting). He expected a conscientious OSHA official to make preliminary
inquiries regarding a newspaper account of an accident before seeking a search warrant. Id. (Pell,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Pell noted that the inspection of Federal's premises was plant-
wide and not concerned merely with the operation which caused the employee's injury. Id. at
1029 (Pell, J., dissenting). He therefore concluded that the actions of the OSHA inspectors in
Federal Die "could hardly be regarded as objectively reasonable." Id. at 1031 (Pell, J.,
dissenting).
64. See supra note 30.
65. 695 F.2d at 1032 (Pell, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell noted that Congress provided numerous re-
quirements for the conduct of a lawful inspection, specifying that OSHA citations may only be
issued "upon inspection or investigation" conducted pursuant to law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.§§ 657(a), 658(a) (1982). In addition, he observed that the legislative history makes clear that "in
carrying out inspection duties under this act, the Secretary, of course, would have to act in accord-
ance with applicable constitutional protections." 116 CoNG. REC. 38,709 (1970) (statement of
Rep. Steiger).
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port of his contention that courts should suppress evidence obtained by
OSHA compliance officers during an illegal inspection of an em-
ployer's workplace. He alleged, contrary to the majority's opinion, that
the suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence would have an "ap-
preciable deterrent effect" on the subsequent conduct of OSHA
officials.68
In addition, Judge Pell denied the majority's assertion that the exclu-
sion of evidence uncovered by an illegal OSHA inspection would re-
sult in "substantial societal harm. '69 Administrative searches differ
fundamentally from criminal searches, he argued, in that the object of
the administrative search does not disappear without some affirmative
action.70 Because no specific time limits govern OSHA inspections,7'
OSHA officials may reinspect business premises upon the issuance of a
second valid warrant.72 If OSHA officials return to a work site to find
that alleged hazardous conditions have disappeared, the agency has
achieved its statutory purpose of abating such conditions.73
67. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Genesee Valley
Indus. Packaging, 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1509, 1510 (Rev. Comm'n 1980) (remedy for fourth
amendment violation is suppression of evidence gained by that violation); Secretary v. Hendrix, 2
O.S.A.H.R.C. 1005, 1022 (1973), afd on other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. OSHARC, 511 F.2d
1139 (9th Cir. 1975) (OSHA citation must be-vacated where not preceded by valid inspection).
68. 695 F.2d at 1028 (Pell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1032-33 (Pell, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1033 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell found that the exclusion of evidence has a
lesser impact in administrative hearings than in criminal cases:
There is less impact from evidence suppression in such administrative hearings than in
criminal cases because the inspector can return and reinspect, employing proper proce-
dures. The Secretary argues that return inspections impose an unreasonable strain on
the agency's already limited manpower .... The best solution is to follow proper pro-
cedures the first time, but lack of personnel certainly should be no justification for riding
rough shod over employer rights. The fault for delay lies with the agency; the remedy
lies there also.
Id. at 1032 (Pell, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 576 F.2d 809, 819 (10th
Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting)).
71. 695 F.2d at 1032 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell rejected the majority's contention that
in certain instances OSHA may not be able to obtain a second warrant because of staleness:
"[The statutory provision governing time of inspections sets no specific time limits. Rather, it
requires the Secretary to inspect 'at reasonable times'. . . or 'as soon as practicable' after receipt
of a complaint .. " Id. at 1032-33 (Pell, J., dissenting) (emphasis original) (quoting Donovan
v. Metal Bank of America, 516 F. Supp. 674, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
72. 695 F.2d at 1032 (Pell, J., dissenting). The warrant requirement of Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), governs subsequent inspections of business premises. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text.
73. 695 F.2d at 1033 (Pell, J., dissenting). If hazardous conditions have not been improved,
of course, OSHA may issue citations.
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In Federal Die, the Seventh Circuit improvidently extended the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule from the criminal setting, where
courts dispute the applicability of the exception,74 to the administrative
setting, where courts question the applicability of the exclusionary rule
itself.7" As Judge Pell explained in dissent, basic distinctions exist be-
tween criminal and administrative searches and seizures. 6 In a crimi-
nal case, the loss of important evidence may seriously impair the ability
of the prosecution to proceed against the defendant.77 In an administra-
tive hearing, however, suppression of evidence under exclusionary
sanctions results in minimal cost to society.78 The only conceivable
harm to society in requiring a second inspection of an employer's work-
place is in terms of delay and increased burdens on OSHA officials.79
The Supreme Court requires a careful balancing of the potential
benefits of exclusion against the potential harm of losing relevant evi-
dence in all fourth amendment exclusionary rule decisions."0 The
Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule on several occasions
where it determined that the social costs of suppressing relevant evi-
dence outweighed the deterrent effect of exclusionary sanctions." Fed-
74. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Important distinctions between criminal
and administrative searches and seizures include the subject of the government search and the site
of the search. Cochell, supra note 2, at 32-33. The target of a criminal search is generally an
individual whose constitutional rights to privacy and liberty are threatened by unwarranted gov-
ernmental action. Id. at 33. The victim of an administrative search, on the other hand, is usually
a business entity whose individual interests are not endangered by the illegal seizure and subse-
quent use of evidence. Id. The location of an administrative inspection is generally a semi-public
business workplace, whereas the site of a criminal search is often the suspect's home. Id. Courts
generally recognize that an individual's expectations of privacy, and thus constitutional protec-
tions, in his home are greater than those in his place of business. Id.
77. See supra note 32.
78 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
79. 695 F.2d at 1032 (Pell, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-55 (1979) (rule rests primarily on the
judgment that deterring police conduct that may invade the constitutional rights of individuals
outweighs importance of securing conviction of specific defendant); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (application of the exclusionary rule is restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIzuR.E: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 1.5 (1978); Note, supra note 10, at
1020 n.5.
81. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (evidence seized in good faith reliance on
statute subsequently held unconstitutional not excluded); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741
(1979) (evidence seized in violation of a voluntarily promulgated administrative regulation not
excluded); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus review of fourth amendment
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eral Die does not present, however, as strong a case for refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule; the social costs of exclusion are negligi-
ble,82 and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on reasonable
and good faith administrative inspections remains uncertain. 3 In the
absence of a strong inclination against suppression of illegally obtained
evidence, the Seventh Circuit improperly adopted, with minimum ex-
planation, a good faith exception which is controversial in the criminal
context and unestablished in the administrative context.
The Supreme Court has euphemistically described the judicial de-
bate over the exclusionary rule and its good faith exception as
"warm."84 The conffict between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits re-
sulting from the Federal Die and Sarasota decisions should intensify
the debate and place added pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve
the good faith issue.
[Just prior to the publication of this Comment, the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard that the
fourth amendment does not require exclusion of evidence seized by po-
lice officers in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant that
is subsequently invalidated by a reviewing court.
In adopting an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, the Court addressed two distinct forms of invalid search warrants.
In Leon, a district court found that probable cause did not support a
search warrant issued by a magistrate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding and accordingly suppressed all evidence ob-
claims that had been reviewed fully in state courts eliminated); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976) (evidence illegally seized by state criminal law enforcement agency not excluded in
federal civil proceedings).
82. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
83. The Federal Die majority believed that the exclusionary rule could not deter OSHA offi-
cials acting in good faith and on reasonable grounds, albeit illegally. 695 F.2d at 1023; see supra
notes 48-57 and accompanying text. Judge Pell argued, contrary to the majority, that the exclu-
sion of unlawfully obtained evidence would have an "appreciable deterrent effect" on the conduct
of OSHA officials. 695 F.2d at 1026, 1028 (PeU, J., dissenting).
In general, the extent of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect is unknown. Empirical studies
have been unsuccessful in determining the rule's actual deterrent value. See, e.g., Andenas, The
Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 649 (1970); Kamisar, Does the Exclusionary Rule Affect
Police Behavior, 62 JUD. 70 (1978); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 665 (1970). "Notwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been
able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 499 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
84. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976).
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tained pursuant to the invalid warrant. The Supreme Court reversed,
refusing to suppress this "inherently trustworthy tangible evidence."
The Court employed the same balancing test it has espoused on numer-
ous occasions in recent years, carefully weighing the "costs and bene-
fits" of suppression. Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded
that the benefits of suppressing evidence obtained in objective reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant are "marginal or nonex-
istent" and that the suppression of such evidence will not deter future
police misconduct.
In Sheppard, the Court held that evidence gathered in objectively
reasonable reliance on a defective warrant may be admissable in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Justice White observed that the failure of
the search warrant in question to specify with particularity the items to
be seized was the fault of the issuing judge, not the police officers. In
Justice White's opinion, the suppression of evidence merely because a
judge failed to make necessary clerical corrections to a search warrant
does not serve the exclusionary rule's deterrent function.
The Court in Leon and Sheppard, two criminal cases, did not specifi-
cally address the applicability of the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule to federal administrative agency proceedings. The
language of the two decisions is vague in this regard and could support
extension of the good faith exception to OSHA proceedings.]
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